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This study aims to analyze the implementation of deconcentration fund held Provincial Government of West Nusa Tenggara from the perspective of agency theory as well as in investigating the problems that the budget absorption experiencing slow back-loaded expenditure of the pattern of budget absorption is slow in the early half of the fiscal year that accumulate at the end of the fiscal year. This type of research is qualitative research with case study approach with the kind of singlecase analysis of multi-unit (embedded). Data was analyzed by using the model of Miles and Hubberman. The key informants in this study is the executive officer of deconcentration fund to the management in fiscal year 2016. Determination of informants implementing deconcentration fund subsequent to the snowball technique. Based on the data, a total of informants who were interviewed is 16 (sixteen) consists of 7 (seven) working unit scope of the Government of West Nusa Tenggara Province with a total of 12 (twelve), Regional Office of Directorate General of Treasury, with a total of two (2) people and KPPN Mataram with a total of two (2) people. The results of the study indicate that there are factors that cause slow back-loaded expenditure in West Nusa Tenggara provincial government which vary in each business unit. But nevertheless there are factors that also have in common. An example is a factor administration, planning, high rate of mutations in the deconcentration fund enforcement officials in the provincial government of West Nusa Tenggara, satker dependence on ministries / agencies and their national policies also affect the implementation of the budget deconcentration. Theoretical implications from the perspective of agency theory found an association delegation of authority from the ministry / institution to work units in the area. Relationships delegation lead to the asymmetrical information (information asymmetry) between the agent and the principal. Additionally dependence satker (agent) in the ministries / agencies (principal) is also a constraint that underlies the relationship between principal and agent in the engagement contract deconcentration fund performance. The balance of information between the pricipal and the agent must be a priority for the achievement of organizational goals effectively and efficiently in the application of the principles of good governance.